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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT
People v. Mabeus'
(decided June 25, 2009)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, David Mabeus was convicted of
robbery in the first degree in Schenectady County.2 On appeal, Ma-
beus claimed that the installation of a global positioning system
("GPS") underneath his vehicle violated his right to be free from un-
reasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 3 The Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment held that the installation of a GPS device underneath the vehicle
constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
and required a search warrant.4
In the later part of 2002 and in July of 2003 four robberies
were committed "at two McDonald's restaurants located in Saratoga
County."5 After an initial investigation, David Mabeus was named a
suspect in each of the four robberies. 6 To further investigate, law en-
forcement obtained a sealed order and search warrant authorizing the
installation of a GPS tracking device underneath Mabeus' vehicle.
Unbeknownst to Mabeus, the GPS tracking device remained attached
to his vehicle for approximately two weeks.8
(Mabeus 1), 885 N.Y.S.2d 363 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2009).
2 Id. at 364.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV, states, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated . . . ." Although the defendant did not claim that the installation of the GPS
violated his rights pursuant to the New York Constitution, this article will discuss the claim
in light of New York's relevant constitutional provisions. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12, states, in
pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .
4 Id. at 366.
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On August 9, 2003, a "robbery occurred at a McDonald's res-
taurant" in Schenectady County.9 The GPS tracking device indicated
that Mabeus' vehicle was in the vicinity of the McDonald's "at the
time of the robbery," as well as earlier that same day.'0 Additionally,
the location data stored in the GPS indicated that after the robbery
occurred the defendant proceeded to his place of employment and
then to his apartment that he shared with his girlfriend." On the
night of the robbery the defendant returned home at approximately
11:55 p.m. 12 Law enforcement greeted him at gunpoint and imme-
diately arrested him.13 At the time of the arrest, the police seized "an
axe, a black ski mask and four wrapped packets of currency ... from
his vehicle."' 4 Mabeus was later interviewed at the police station and
a McDonald's employee identified him in a show-up." The police
officers subsequently obtained two court ordered warrants to search
Mabeus' "pick-up truck, his place of employment and his resi-
dence."' 6 As a result of the search, more inculpatory evidence was
discovered and later presented at trial.' 7
Mabeus was charged with various crimes in connection with
the robbery of the McDonald's restaurant.' 8 Prior to trial, Mabeus
moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the GPS tracking de-
vice.19 The court refused to grant a Mapp/Dunaway hearing20 and
upheld the validity of the search warrant and sealed order.2' Mabeus
pleaded guilty to first degree robbery, but did not waive his right to
appeal.22 He was "sentenced to [twenty] years in prison and five
9 Id.










20 A Mapp/Dunaway hearing determines whether evidence seized by law enforcement of-
ficials was in violation of the Fourth Amendment based on a lack of probable cause and
should therefore be suppressed. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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years of postrelease supervision." 2 3
On appeal, Mabeus argued that "the only basis for the police
officers' actions was the information obtained through the GPS track-
ing device that was installed under a purportedly illegal sealed or-
der."24 Moreover, Mabeus claimed there were several deficiencies in
the application "for the sealed order and search warrants," particular-
ly lack of probable cause. 25 Finding for Mabeus on this issue, the ap-
pellate division remitted the matter to the county court to conduct a
Mapp/Dunaway hearing to examine the issuance of the sealed order
and search warrant.26 On remittal, the county court concluded that
based on the "four corners of the search warrant and supporting do-
cumentation, [the application] was supported by probable cause and
that no hearing was necessary." 27
In his final appeal, Mabeus argued that the placement of the
GPS tracking device underneath his vehicle violated his Fourth
Amendment rights afforded under the United States Constitution.28
The threshold issue presented on appeal was whether the installation
of a GPS tracking device is a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 29 After considering the facts of the case, the court held
that the installation of the GPS underneath his vehicle constituted a
search within the parameters of the Fourth Amendment and required
a search warrant. 30 To secure the placement of the GPS tracking de-
vice underneath the vehicle, police investigators obtained "a dupli-
cate key for [the] defendant's vehicle" that was used to remove the
vehicle from the parking lot while the defendant was inside the parole
office.31  The GPS was then hardwired "under the hood of the ve-
hicle." 32 The officers "not only gained access to the interior of de-
fendant's vehicle to install the device, but actually moved the vehicle
to a location where the device could be more easily installed."3  The
23 id.
24 Id. at 666.
25 id.
26 Mabeus I, 850 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
27 Mabeus II, 885 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
28 Id. at 365.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 366.
3" Mabeus I, 885 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
32 id.
3 Id. at 366.
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installation of the GPS tracking device greatly infringed upon Ma-
beus' legitimate expectation of privacy. 34 To be sure, police officers
must obtain a search warrant before employing the use of a GPS to
track the whereabouts of an individual.35
The United States Supreme Court has yet to address whether
the use of GPS tracking devices by law enforcement is a search with-
in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.3 6 However, in United
States v. Knotts the Court held that the installation of an electronic
beeper in a container of chloroform to track its whereabouts was not a
search.37 In Knotts, law enforcement learned that one of the defen-
dants, a former employee of the 3M Chemical Company, was stealing
chemicals commonly used to manufacture illegal drugs.3 8 The de-
fendant also purchased large quantities of similar drugs at the Haw-
kins Chemical Company. 39 To further monitor the situation, the "of-
ficers installed [an electronic] beeper inside a five gallon container of
chloroform" that was later purchased by the defendant. 40 Following
the purchase, officers followed the defendant to a cabin where he,
along with others, operated a drug laboratory.
In writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist asserted that one
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy while driving on
public roadways, and that the defendant "voluntarily conveyed to an-
yone who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particu-
lar roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made,
and the fact of his final destination when he exited from public roads
onto private property." 42 The Court further clarified that
scientific enhancement of this sort raises no constitu-
tional issues which visual surveillance would not also
raise. A police car following [the defendant] at a dis-
tance throughout his journey could have observed him
leaving the public highway and arriving at the cabin
34 id.
35 id.
3 Mabeus II, 885 N.Y.S.2d at 365.





42 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82.
854 [Vol. 26
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owned by [the] respondent, with the drum of chloro-
form still in the car.43
In essence, the electronic beeper was merely a tool used by law en-
forcement to aid them in tracking the movement of the chloroform
container.4
Bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Knotts, several
federal circuit courts of appeals have held that the warrantless use of
an electronic beeper to monitor the movement of contraband does not
fall under the umbrella of the Fourth Amendment.45 Specifically, in
United States v. Pretzinger, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the attachment of an electronic device to the outside of an air-
plane did not constitute a search. 4 6 In Pretzinger, an electronic bee-
per was placed on an airplane that was suspected of transporting sig-
nificant quantities of marijuana.47 After installing the beeper, agents
from the Drug Enforcement Administration continued to follow and
survey the airplane. 48  The defendant argued that the warrantless
placement of the beeper on the airplane constituted an illegal
search. 49 The court, however, reasoned that the
attachment of an electronic location device to a ve-
hicle moving about on public thoroughfares (or
through the public airspace) does not infringe upon
any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore
does not constitute a search. Consequently, no war-
rant is needed to justify installation of an electronic
43 Id. at 285.
4 Id. But see United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (holding that the warrant-
less "monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance,
violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the privacy
of the residence"). In Karo, law enforcement agents installed an electronic tracking device
in a can of ether and monitored its movement on public roads as well as in the defendant's
house. Id at 708-09. In its decision, the Supreme Court clarified that the use ofan electron-
ic beeper for surveillance purposes can only be used to monitor activity that could otherwise
be visually observed in public. See id. at 714-15.
45 See United States v. Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 520
(9th Cir. 1976).
46 Pretzinger, 542 F.2d at 520.
47 Id. at 519.
48 id.
49 Id. at 520.
2010] 855
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beeper unless [F]ourth [A]mendment rights necessari-
ly would have to be violated in order to initially install
the device.o
Individuals have a diminished expectation of privacy on public road-
ways because they can be easily observed and monitored.5 '
Similarly, in United States v. Moore, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the placement of an electronic beeper in a quantity
of chemicals likely to be used to manufacture drugs did not constitute
a search under the Fourth Amendment.5 2 In Moore, DEA agents
were alerted that the defendants ordered roughly seven hundred dol-
lars worth of chemicals. 53 Since there was probable cause to believe
the defendants were purchasing this large amount of chemicals to
manufacture illegal drugs, the agents placed an electronic beeper in
the package of chemicals that was later picked up by the defen-
dants.54 The officers also placed a beeper underneath the vehicles the
defendants used to transport the chemicals. 5 The court reasoned that
the defendants
had no reason to believe that their movements on the
public highway would remain private [or] that their
route . . . would be their secret. . . . Moreover, [the]
defendants had no right to assume that law enforce-
ment officers would not enhance their ability to see or
track them by use of various artificial means such as
binoculars or even radar, or by observing them from
the air.56
Similar to the reasoning in Knotts, an individual has a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy in public places. 7
Since the Supreme Court has yet to rule on this specific issue,
Knotts remains binding on lower federal courts. For example, the
50 Id.
s" Pretzinger, 542 F.2d at 520.
52 Moore, 562 F.2d at 111.
" Id. at 108.
54 id
55 Id.
56 Id. at 112.
5 See Moore, 562 F.2d at 112.
856 [Vol. 26
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United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
clarified its continued support of Knotts by asserting that "[flaw en-
forcement personnel could have conducted a visual surveillance of
the vehicle as it traveled on the public highways. . . . [And that one]
ha[s] no expectation of privacy in the whereabouts of his vehicle on a
public roadway."" Based on the current state of federal law, the use
of electronic tracking devices to monitor the movements of individu-
als in public areas by law enforcement fails to raise any Fourth
Amendment issues with respect to warrantless searches. 59
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the New York Court
of Appeals has held that the installation of GPS tracking device is a
search, and therefore, requires a warrant. 60 In People v. Weaver, a
state police investigator attached a GPS to the bumper of the defen-
dant's vehicle. 6 1 The GPS remained under the defendant's bumper
for sixty-five days and monitored the position and location of the ve-
hicle within thirty feet. 62 Police officers regularly drove past the ve-
hicle to download the location information stored in the GPS. 63
The defendant was later tried for the burglaries of the Latham
Meat Market in July 2005 and a K-Mart department store on Decem-
ber 24 of the same year.64 At trial, the prosecution moved to intro-
duce the GPS recordings, which indicated that the defendant's ve-
hicle slowly passed through the K-Mart parking lot in the early
evening hours of December 24.65 The court denied the defendant's
motion to suppress and admitted the GPS tracking device record-
ings.66 After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of third degree
58 United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
5 See Shovea, 580 F.2d at 1388; Moore, 562 F.2d at 111; Pretzinger, 542 F.2d at 520
(holding that the use of an electronic beeper to aid in visual surveillance is not a search under
the Fourth Amendment and does not require a warrant).
60 People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1202 (N.Y. 2009).
61 Id. at 1195-96.
62 id.
63 Id. at 1196.
6 Id.
65 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1196.
66 Id. In addition to the evidence obtained from the GPS, an accomplice to the burglary
testified that she drove through the K-Mart parking lot with the defendant on the date of the
crime. Id. She further testified that the defendant wore dark clothing and was casing the
store. Id. Moreover, after the robbery the accomplice's hand was bleeding. Id. Evidence
later confirmed that the accomplice's blood matched the blood found on the jewelry case
broken into during the burglary. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1196.
2010] 857
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burglary.67 The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the
conviction and held that the installation of the GPS tracking device
without a warrant did not violate the defendant's rights under the
New York Constitution.68 Consistent with the several federal circuit
courts of appeals that have entertained this issue, the appellate divi-
sion reasoned that one has a "reduced expectation of privacy in the
exterior of [the] vehicle."69
The New York Court of Appeals held that the installation of a
GPS tracking device violated Weaver's legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy, as well as his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches. 70 The New York Constitution is protective of an individu-
al's expectation of privacy in that:
The right of the people to be secure against unreason-
able interception of telephone and telegraph commu-
nications shall not be violated, and ex parte orders or
warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that
there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of
crime may be thus obtained, and identifying the par-
ticular means of communication, and particularly de-
scribing the person or persons whose communications
are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof.71
Arguably, with respect to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the New
York Constitution provides individuals greater protection than the
United States Constitution.
While arguably the facts of Weaver are analogous to Knotts,
the New York Court of Appeals distinguished between an electronic
beeper and a GPS tracking device. The court characterized the elec-
tronic beeper inserted in the container of chloroform in Knotts as a
"primitive tracking device" that was merely a tool utilized by law en-
forcement to enhance their investigation.72 Moreover, the majority
recognized that unlike a beeper, a GPS tracking device "is a vastly




70 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1201.
71 Id. (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12).
72 Id. at 1199.
858 [Vol. 26
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different and exponentially more sophisticated and powerful technol-
ogy that is easily and cheaply deployed, and [one that] has virtually
unlimited and remarkably precise tracking capability."73 Further-
more, while the electronic beeper employed in Knotts was used more
for visual enhancement, the use of a GPS lends itself to "twenty-four
hour surveillance."74 Lastly, the "dragnet use of [this type of] tech-
nology at the sole discretion of law enforcement authorities to pry in-
to the details of people's daily lives is not consistent with the values
at the core of our State Constitution's prohibition against unreasona-
ble searches."75
While an individual does in fact have a diminished expecta-
tion of privacy on public roadways, "a vehicle upon a public way
does not affect a complete surrender of any objectively reasonable,
,,76 bsocially acceptable privacy expectation. To be sure, one's legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in his home does not entirely disappear
when traveling in public.7 7 Furthermore, "[t]he residual privacy ex-
pectation [that the] defendant retained in his vehicle, while perhaps
small, was at least adequate to support his claim of a violation of his
constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches and sei-
zures." 78 In the opinion of the majority, tracking the defendant's ve-
hicle for sixty-five days was not only an abuse of police discretion,
but an abuse of his right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment.79
Weaver adopted a new standard with respect to the warrant-
less use of GPS tracking devices by law enforcement.o Compared to
the United States Constitution, the New York Constitution provides
"greater protections when circumstances warrant," which has allowed
for the development of "an independent body of state law in the area
of search and seizure." 8' Therefore, the warrantless installation and
prolonged use of a GPS device to monitor a defendant's whereabouts
interferes with his legitimate expectation of privacy and violates his
73Id.
74 Id. at 1200 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283).
7 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1203.
76 Id. at 1201.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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rights afforded under the New York Constitution.82
While the majority in Weaver focused on how the rapid ad-
vancement of new technology threatens individual rights to privacy,
the dissent characterized the GPS tracking device as a technological
tool that merely aids in law enforcement investigation. The dissent
noted that with available resources "the police could, without a war-
rant and without any basis other than a hunch that [the] defendant
was up to no good, have assigned an officer, or team of officers, to
follow him everywhere he went, so long as he remained in public
places."84 Arguably, the majority's decision in Weaver unjustifiably
impedes law enforcement's ability to investigate and curb criminal
activity.8 5 In expressing its concern with leveling the playing field
with respect to technological advancements, the dissent stated that
criminals will undeniably make use of the "modem and efficient tools
available to them, and will not get warrants before doing so." 86 Un-
like the majority opinion, the dissent is not as much concerned with
an individual's right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment, but the
security and welfare of society as a whole. While individual privacy
rights must be weighed against protecting society, arguably the ma-
jority's opinion tips too far in favor of the individual.
The dissenting opinion in Weaver did, however, focus on the
indisputable trespass that occurred when the officers installed the
GPS underneath the defendant's vehicle without his consent.8 7 "The
idea of a police officer-or anyone else-sneaking under someone's
car in the middle of the night to attach a tracking device" is an illegal
trespass. While the police officers unlawfully trespassed upon
Weaver's vehicle, they did not violate any of his constitutional rights
afforded under the New York Constitution.89 Furthermore, "[n]o au-
thority . .. holds that a trespass on private property, without more, is
an unlawful search when the property is in a public place." 90 To be
sure, a careful distinction must be made between property and priva-
82 id.
83 Id. at 1204 (Smith, J., dissenting).
8 Id.
85 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1204.
86 id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1205.
89 Id. at 1206.
9 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1206.
860 [Vol. 26
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cy interests with respect to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
The dissent in Weaver correctly refocused the issue by dis-
cussing property rights in the context of trespass. In Mabeus, the po-
lice officers violated the defendant's expectation of respect for his
property by making a duplicate key, physically removing his vehicle,
hardwiring the GPS under the hood, and then returning the vehicle
back to its original location. 91 While Mabeus had a property interest
in his vehicle, he did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the constitutional sense.92
The court in Mabeus was bound by the New York Court of
Appeal's decision in Weaver. Thus, the landmark case worthy of
analysis is Weaver, as it is a clear departure from both federal and
state law precedent. The question then becomes at what point do
technological advancements become "so good" that they threaten to
infringe upon one's right to privacy? While the GPS device is cer-
tainly more technologically advanced than the electronic beeper uti-
lized in Knotts, is it so dramatically different that it warrants a differ-
ent kind of treatment? The short answer is no; it does not warrant
any special treatment. The dissent in Weaver clarified that "[t]he
proposition that some devices are too modern and sophisticated to be
used freely in police investigation is not a defensible rule of constitu-
tional law."93 Thus, while the GPS tracking device is more technolo-
gically advanced than an electronic beeper, it should not be treated
any differently.
While the New York Court of Appeal's decision in Weaver
protects individual privacy interests, it does so at the expense of so-
ciety. Police officers keep our streets safe and curb criminal activity.
Much like a flashlight or binoculars, technological advancements like
the GPS tracking devices aid and enhance law enforcement investiga-
tions. To accomplish this goal, police officers could have placed a
squad car in the parking lot for twenty-four hours or followed the de-
fendant around in a helicopter. Making use of the GPS was simply a
more resourceful and efficient way to track the movements of the de-
fendant.
Arguably, unfettered use of a GPS tracking device resembles
91 Mabeus II, 885 N.Y.S.2d at 365-66.
92 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1206 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Natal, 553
N.E.2d 239, 240 (1990)).
9 Id. at 1204.
2010] 861
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the overreaching hand of the government in the lives of its citizens.
However, law enforcement has the responsibility to protect and pro-
mote the welfare of its citizens. In each of the cases examined, law
enforcement had reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity
was afoot. In Moore, for example, the DEA learned that the defen-
dant and others ordered several hundred dollars worth of chemicals
commonly used to manufacture illicit drugs.94 A similar situation
presented itself in Knotts, in which the defendants purchased large
quantities of chloroform to produce methamphetamine. 95 In Pretzin-
ger, law enforcement suspected an airplane was transporting signifi-
cant quantities of marijuana and felt that the installation of an elec-
tronic beeper would aid in tracking its whereabouts.96 In each of
these cases, police officers had reasonable suspicion to believe crimi-
nal conduct was imminent. To be sure, the decision to use a GPS was
not arbitrary or capricious, but instead based on each officer's train-
ing and expertise in the field. The New York Court of Appeals deci-
sion in Weaver and subsequent decisions by lower courts, particularly
Mabeus, have stripped police officers of their ability to use discre-
tion. It is hopeful, however, that based on the several federal circuit
court decisions and the precedent set forth in Knotts, that the United
States Supreme Court will find GPS tracking devices to be innovative
tools that may be utilized by law enforcement without judicial inter-
vention.
Christina Pinnola
94 Moore, 562 F.2d at 108.
95 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
96 Pretzinger, 542 F.2d at 519.
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